Naming and trust

Service names are global and first-come in the on-chain registry. The contract guarantees that only the owner can create, modify, or delete their registration, so nobody can hijack an existing one. Two further protections matter when services consume other services.

Endpoint verification

A squatter could register a name that points at someone else’s endpoint. Pass verifyEndpoint: true to AgentClient and discovery cross-checks the endpoint’s live /manifest: its service and ownerWallet must match the on-chain record, or the call throws EndpointVerificationError.

const client = new AgentClient({ /* … */ verifyEndpoint: true });

Escrow receiver binding

A provider only serves an escrow that names it as receiver, so a registration pointing at a victim’s endpoint cannot extract free work.

What is not protected

Taking an unused brand name before its rightful owner is inherent to a permissionless registry. Production marketplaces are expected to curate discovery on top of the registry with reputation and verified badges. Namespacing by owner plus service with a curated alias is the planned hardening; it changes call-by-bare-name, so it is a deliberate non-goal of the current version.

Pick a descriptive, specific name you are willing to keep.